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how we turn, reciprocal non-interference by Europe and America in each other's politics was accepted as the distinctive and vital essence of the Monroe Doctrine.

Of the observance of the Monroe Doctrine, one of the results has been the growth of an American system, the central thought of which is expressed by the word Pan-Americanism. What we call Pan-Americanism is the outgrowth of the conception that there is such a thing as an American system, and that this system is independent of and different from the European system. In this relation I ventured to say, in a work published before the idea of a world-league had come to occupy an appreciable place in the public mind, that to the extent to which Europe should become implicated in American politics and America should become implicated in European politics, this distinction would necessarily be broken down and the foundations of the American system impaired; and that "to the extent to which the

foundations of the American system were impaired, Pan-Americanism would lose its vitality and the Monroe Doctrine its accustomed and tangible meaning."

I have seen no occasion to modify these statements, which may, I think, fairly be regarded as truisms. The question whether the United States should continue to adhere to the Monroe Doctrine or should abandon it in favor of some other policy, is, like other political questions, a legitimate subject of discussion. But it is desirable that the discussion should be conducted with a frank recognition and intelligent appreciation of the fact that the Monroe Doctrine is distinctively American both in its origin and in the sphere of its operation; that non-interference in European politics was and has continued to be its source, inspiration and justification; and that the title can not be applied to policies involving participation in world-politics without discarding its actual and distinctive meaning and perverting it to fanciful uses in unknown realms.

The Monroe Doctrine and American Participation in European Affairs

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THE influence upon the Monroe Doctrine by this country's participation in European and world affairs involves that secondary phase of the doctrine which assumes that if we ask non-American powers to keep out of America, we must ourselves keep hands off in other parts of the world. The implication seems upon first thought to be a reasonable one. More careful consideration, however, very soon reveals the fact that the problem is by no means simple; that our attitude on

the subject is dependent, first, on our interpretation of the doctrine, and second, upon the character or nature of our participation.

EXPANSION OF THE DOCTRINE

As everyone knows, the Monroe Doctrine has been considerably developed and expanded since it was first promulgated. It began with the enunciation of the policy, "that the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future pow-

ers" and "that we should regard any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." In the frequent reassertion of the doctrine by subsequent administrations, it has been enlarged to include not only territorial but commercial and financial independence as well.¹ And in the Magdalena Bay incident we went a step further and proclaimed the integrity of harbors against foreign corporate possession or control.² Secretary of State Olney's extravagant claim that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects upon which it confines its interposition" has fortunately not been taken seriously as a new phase of the doctrine. On the other hand our claim to the exclusive control of the Canal Zone and our implied assumption of responsibility for orderly governments in the lesser states under Mr. Roosevelt's administration³ has had a wider acceptance.

But despite the fact that the Monroe Doctrine has thus become more complicated and broader in its application, there is underlying all its development

¹ Cf. President Roosevelt's First Annual Message, December 3, 1901. "Through the Monroe Doctrine we hope to be able to safeguard like independence and secure like permanence for the lesser among the new world nations . . . it is really a guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas."

² Senate Resolutions, August 2, 1912—Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the American continent is so situated that the possession thereof for naval and military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other places by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for naval or military purposes. *Congressional Record*, Vol. 48, 10046.

³ President Roosevelt's Fifth Annual Message, December 5, 1905.

the basic idea of President Monroe's message, so clearly expressed by Mr. Moore,⁴ namely, "America for the Americans." In this sense it has been, along with non-intervention in the affairs of Europe, the cardinal feature of the nation's foreign policy for ninety-eight years. It has become so identified with our national history and our thinking on foreign relations, that to the average American it is axiomatic. Like the constitution, it is regarded as a part of the warp and woof of our national life, sacrosanct and therefore not to be disturbed. To others, on the contrary, it has outlived its usefulness and stands today as an obsolete "shibboleth," out of accord with the progress of recent years. Conditions that called it forth are gone forever, they say, while new conditions have arisen that with equal emphasis demand its discontinuance.

HISTORIC BACKGROUND

From the period of the geographic discoveries onward, European powers looked on the new territories and colonies as regions to be used and exploited solely for their own benefit. Inter-course with the colonies was monopolized by the mother country. Their trade was closely restricted to the home land. Commercial exclusion of all other countries was the accepted rule of trade. The first break in this system of old-world trade monopoly came with the American Revolution. The political independence of the thirteen colonies brought with it commercial and economic emancipation also. But while North America was thus freed, Central and South America remained politically and economically under Spanish and Portuguese rule. Indeed, they were bound to the old order by an iron clad system of trade monopoly

⁴ See page 31.

much more stringent than the English had ever been. Entirely shut off from commercial intercourse with the outside world, even their trade with the mother country was confined to the Spanish fleet which came to them only twice a year.

In 1808 this system too came to an abrupt end. In that year Napoleon conquered Spain. The Bourbon government was overthrown and the Spanish American colonies were obliged to shift for themselves. This proved their opportunity. Trade relations with England and the United States were soon established, and for a decade and a half the ties thus drawn grew stronger.

With the overthrow of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna came the reaction and the effort to restore the old order once more. At the Congress of Verona the powers of the Holy Alliance proposed that the Spanish colonies be coerced and forced to return to their former allegiance. To the United States and England the situation gave real cause for opposition. Reconquest of the colonies would ruin the newly-developed trade of both countries with Latin America for many years.

To the United States, however, there was additional cause for concern. The Holy Alliance was the most powerful combination of reactionary powers Europe had ever seen, and its interference in America seemed a direct threat against the liberties and independence of the United States itself. The reasons for the proclamation of the doctrine were therefore varied. One of the motives was undoubtedly altruistic and born of a genuine interest in the cause of liberty. Others were more selfish, based on a desire to preserve the lucrative trade possibilities and on a genuine fear lest the establishment of the European system in America would become a menace to our own security.

OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE

All these reasons have long since disappeared. Colonial conquest no longer carries with it an exclusive trade monopoly. Our own trade with South America needs to be promoted with greater intelligence and zeal, it is true, but it is not in danger from any reactionary political system in Europe. Furthermore, the cause of liberty is no longer in jeopardy from this source. The Latin American states are so strong that European powers could not, if they would, set up by force reactionary governments in America. They are capable of taking care of themselves. Brazil, Chile and the Argentine do not need our protection; indeed, they are offended by our repeated assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, and regard it as an affront. There is an element of patronage which they resent, the more so since even the intelligent American is too often quite ignorant of the splendid civilization and culture of the chief cities of Latin America. Buenos Aires and other cities, we are told, feel themselves closer to Europe in sympathy than with the United States with its hodgepodge of racial elements. Even geographically they are nearer Europe, and commercial and cultural relations with the old world are correspondingly closer.

Under such conditions opponents of the Monroe Doctrine ask why this country still adheres to it. Further, the United States in recent years has been drawn into European affairs more and more, and a situation has thus been created in our relations to other powers that makes adherence to the doctrine inconsistent and unsound. By what right can we insist on the powers keeping hands off the American continent while we intervene in the affairs of Europe, Asia and Africa? These and other familiar arguments are urged

against the retention of the Monroe Doctrine as an essential feature of our foreign policy. Are the objections valid?

In the first place it can not be said with certainty that the danger of foreign powers in the Americas is entirely a matter of the past or of history. The determined effort of Germany in 1902 to make of the controversy with Venezuela an excuse for the seizure and occupation of a port is conclusive evidence of the fact that as late as 1902 it was a very real threat. President Roosevelt said of it:

I became convinced that Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the model of Kiauchau, with a view to exercising some degree of control over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs generally.⁵

When the Emperor refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, Mr. Roosevelt acted with his usual promptness and vigor. The German ambassador was told that we did not intend to have another Kiauchau . . . on the approach to the Isthmian Canal.

I asked him, says Mr. Roosevelt, to inform his government that if no notification for arbitration came within a certain specified number of days, I should be obliged to order Dewey to take the fleet to the Venezuelan coast and see that the German forces did not take possession of any territory.

A few days later when no answer had as yet arrived, the date of Dewey's sailing was advanced twenty-four hours, and the ambassador informed of the fact. With that Germany concluded this country meant business and ordered the withdrawal of its squadron.

The Holy Alliance is gone, but other alliances are possible today that would be a far more serious menace. Brazil, Chile and the Argentine are strong and

self-sufficient, but what of Mexico and the states of Central America?

There are good arguments for the belief that at no time in history have the Americas, especially Central America, held out such alluring attractions to the ambitions of the great powers. The importance of the Panama route, and the evidence on all sides of the great natural wealth and virgin resources of South and Central America are being more and more appreciated. The unoccupied lands of the globe have been occupied. Future expansion and colonization must be at the expense of the powers already in possession. To the imperialists of European and other powers the possibility of acquiring a foothold in Latin America would be alluring, to say the least, if we receded from our position on the Monroe Doctrine.

The objection to the popular belief that these Americas constitute a sort of geographic unity, the different parts closely related through propinquity, seems at first thought to be well taken. It is true that parts of South America are nearer Europe than they are to the United States. But distance alone in such cases is not of prime importance. With the opening of the Panama Canal, and the rapidly increasing importance of the Gulf and the Caribbean basin, the bonds of commercial interests between the United States and Latin America are being rapidly extended and strengthened. The geographic factor is today much stronger than it ever was in the past in favor of closer relations with Latin America. Instead of being an argument against the doctrine, therefore, it is one of the strong reasons for its continuation. Indeed, with the growth of an active community of interest both commercial and cultural, it is quite conceivable that the Monroe Doctrine should some day be expanded and proclaimed as

⁵ Bishop, J. B., *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*, I, 222.

a Pan-American doctrine. Something would undoubtedly be gained by such a corporate endorsement of the doctrine by the A. B. C. powers of South America. On the other hand it would introduce serious complications and in all probability cause suspicions and delays that would more than undo the good resulting from such coöperation.

POLICY OF ISOLATION

But the specific problem is the question of how our position on the Monroe Doctrine can be reconciled with the increasing frequency of our participation as a great power in European and world affairs. Non-interference in European matters, it is urged, is quite as strong a tradition in American diplomacy as is the doctrine itself. This is quite true. On the other hand it is not true that the Monroe Doctrine must stand or fall with this tradition. The policy of isolation and non-intervention was enunciated many years before the Monroe Doctrine. The famous words of Washington's Farewell Address are familiar to everyone. The idea is expressed even more trenchantly in Jefferson's well known apothegm, "friendly relations with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

With this established principle of our foreign policy the Monroe Doctrine is in perfect accord. By preventing the extension of the European systems in America we have a much better chance of maintaining friendly relations with them. Free and safe from their systems, we can the better avoid entangling alliances. But this is very different from shutting ourselves off from participation in world affairs or even European matters if they vitally affect our interests or those of humanity at large. Indeed, the spirit that underlies the Monroe Doctrine is in perfect harmony with such participation.

By asserting the right of the infant

republics of Latin America to free and unmolested development the Monroe Doctrine did much more than issue a warning to the Holy Alliance. Like the Declaration of Independence it proclaimed the great principle of the right of self-government against oppression to be axiomatic. The doctrine involves, said John Quincy Adams, the basic principles of the right of self-government. It asserts the right of struggling peoples to free and independent development, and then as a logical application of the principle sets limits to the extension of the systems of European powers in America. Indeed, it seems to have been chiefly because of this larger feature involved in the doctrine that President Monroe's cabinet decided upon a Presidential proclamation of policy rather than entrusting Rush with discretionary power.

Later administrations have emphasized the same idea. In December, 1895, President Cleveland declared the Monroe Doctrine "can not become obsolete while our republic endures, for it is founded on the theory that every people shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced."

AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The fundamental meaning and spirit of the doctrine is therefore quite in accord with our participation in European and world affairs. Indeed, if it were not so the doctrine would be doomed. For it is plainly impossible for a great power like the United States with over one hundred million people, vast resources, commerce and international relations, to isolate itself.

Indeed, according to some, the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine was in itself an interference in European affairs. We manifestly took the side of England against the powers of the Continent, and for half a century the

doctrine was a reality in part at least because of British coöperation. For other illustrations of our participation in international matters not strictly American I need refer only to our share in the two Hague Conferences, to our beneficent services in the settlement of the Russo-Japanese war in the peace of Portsmouth, to the less-known incident of our participation in the Algerçiras settlement in 1906, and lastly to our share in the world war and the Peace Conference at Versailles.

In connection with the Hague Conferences it is a matter of considerable interest in this connection to recall that the American delegates were by general agreement permitted to annex to their signature to the convention for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, that nothing therein contained should be so interpreted as to require the United States "to depart from its traditional policy of not entering upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state," or to relinquish "its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." A reservation of similar import was attached to the general act of the Algerçiras Conference. The practice of our government therefore assumes that there is no basic inconsistency between a certain kind of participation in European affairs and a vigorous assertion of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand there is always the danger that an over-aggressive policy in this direction may seriously compromise our position.

THE ALGERÇIRAS INCIDENT

In the opinion of some, the part played by President Roosevelt in connection with the Algerçiras Conference had in it many of the elements for such a development. The facts concerning

our share in the Moroccan question have not until recently been divulged and the people of this country have not had the slightest idea of the extraordinary and altogether dominating rôle played by our government in bringing about a settlement in 1906.

It is a diplomatic secret that President Roosevelt is entitled to the credit of arranging the important Algerçiras Conference of 1906 and dictating the terms on which war between France and Germany with the possible involvement of England as the Ally of France, was averted. . . . In the end the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the Convention.⁶

The truth of these remarkable statements, startling though they are, seems to be fully borne out by the secret documents, hitherto suppressed at Mr. Roosevelt's request even by the powers principally concerned. From the evidence in the case as furnished in Mr. Bishop's two chapters entitled "The Secret History of the Algerçiras Controversy" it appears that he was able to dictate terms largely because the Emperor had repeatedly urged him to bring about the conference, assuring him that Germany would accept the awards. The Emperor had in fact gone further, declaring that Germany had no desire for territory or influence, only the general peace and the open door.

Thus in the first Memorandum from the German government it is stated "that Germany asked for no gains in Morocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for equal rights to all nations there." In a letter of April 25, Sternburg wrote:

France had offered to come to a separate agreement and make concessions, but that he (the Emperor) had refused because he

⁶ Bishop, J. P.: *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*. I, p. 467.

was disinterestedly championing the cause of the world at large. . . . The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he should discover that he should receive no support from the interested treaty powers in connection with the open door and the conference, he would be forced to think of Germany alone. Only then—and not before—he would have to choose between the possibility of a war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war.⁷

Despite this, it soon became apparent after the conference assembled at Algieriras that the Emperor was far from being so disinterested. What Germany really wanted was a sphere of influence in Morocco, or to quote Mr. Roosevelt:

Aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco . . . she first attempted to obtain a port for herself, and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzerland, which we are convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland become in effect German.⁸

Convinced that France would not yield, Mr. Roosevelt submitted four propositions as a settlement of the deadlock. These assumed the policy of the open door, that is:

That all commercial nations are entitled to have the door of equal opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to that principle, that no one power ought to acquire such a control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the belief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that territory as her own to the exclusion of others. (Root to Sternburg, March 17, 1914.)

The proposal, however, placed the police control in French and Spanish hands and to this Germany objected vigorously. It was then that the

President used the "big stick." He says, in commenting on Germany's finally yielding:

I had previously informed Speck, in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in rejecting our proposals and a break-up ensued, I should be obliged to publish the entire correspondence and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith.

Now it is a grave question how far American executive action should go in such matters. It is not at all inconceivable that negotiations of so delicate a nature and on so important a problem might get us into war. It certainly is somewhat of a departure from the doctrines of the fathers. On the other hand there was nothing in the Algieriras episode to compromise our position on the Monroe Doctrine with respect to America.

ARBITRATION TREATIES

A good deal has been made of the Bryan arbitration treaties in their effect on the Monroe Doctrine. More than two dozen such treaties were negotiated and signed by our government in the years immediately before and during the war. These treaties provided definitely that:

The high contracting parties agree that all disputes between them of every nature whatsoever, to the settlement of which previous arbitration treaties and agreements do not apply in their terms or are not applied in fact, shall, when diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed, be referred for international investigation and report to an international commission, [and] they agree not to declare war or begin hostilities during such investigation and before the report is submitted.

Now it is obvious that "disputes . . . of every nature whatsoever" would include disputes involving the Monroe Doctrine. Therefore this country def-

⁷ Bishop, J. P.: *Theodore Roosevelt and his Time*. I, p. 470.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

initely pledged itself in the treaties to refer "matters involving the doctrine to an international commission for investigation and report." This does not mean, however, as Professor Wilson would have us believe, that we have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine.⁹ To agree to delay action and possible hostilities till the questions in dispute have been investigated and reported upon does not by any stretch of the imagination, waive, as he says, the "purely national and American character" of the doctrine.

MONROE DOCTRINE FOR THE WORLD?

Nor is there here any reason for the championing by this country of a Monroe Doctrine for the world. We received with acclaim President Wilson's splendid appeal in the critical days just before we entered the war.

That no nation should attempt to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to develop its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

This is excellent as an expression of sentiment or even as an international creed. On the other hand there is no warrant for the assertion that this and similar expressions of lofty internationalism by President Wilson, or indeed our participation in the World War, have superseded the Monroe Doctrine and set up in its stead a Monroe Doctrine for the world. Such a doctrine would not be a Monroe Doctrine even if sponsored by this country. It precludes by its very nature certain basic features of that doctrine and is entirely

⁹ "If thus for half of the states of the world the Monroe Doctrine may now be subjected to international standards of judgment, its purely national and American character may be said to have been waived." Professor G. G. Wilson, *The Monroe Doctrine After the War*.

foreign to the historic background and conception of President Monroe's message. Indeed, it involves the abandonment of the doctrine as an American policy. Why then call it a Monroe Doctrine? Why retain the name if we get rid of the substance?

Apparently, however, the people of this country are not ready to abandon the substance if the last elections can be taken as voicing its judgment on that question. The verdict was decisive in favor of a retention of the nationalistic application of the ideas of the doctrine.

It was therefore in accord with the nation's mandate that President Harding at the unveiling of the Bolivar Statue in New York some time ago reasserted the doctrine declaring that this country stands "willing to fight if necessary to protect these continents and their sturdy young democracy from oppression and tyranny." Secretary Hughes' reply to the Poles that the United States would not intervene in the Silesian dispute is along the same line.

DOCTRINE AS OBSTACLE TO WAR

This clear-cut enunciation of policy removes at one stroke all dangers of equivocation as to our attitude toward the doctrine. Our uncompromising stand on the doctrine and our manifest determination to back it up by force, if need be, has repeatedly cleared up an ugly situation that might otherwise have led to war. The dangers of equivocation and weakness are evident. Clearly understood policies rarely lead to war.

By asserting the principle of non-intervention in the face of Austria, Russia, Prussia and France, which powers had just decreed intervention to reestablish the absolutism of Ferdinand in Spain [says Professor Moore], the United States prevented the necessity of its own intervention by precluding the occasion for it.

By constantly upholding and asserting the principles of the doctrine, this country has given to it the force of international law for now nearly a century and that without firing a single shot. After December, 1823, the European powers knew what to expect, and though frequently tempted to establish themselves, they were always induced in the face of our well-known policy to keep hands off. The old adage "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" holds still.

The Monroe Doctrine may not be a part of international law. It may be as Bismarck said, a piece of "international impertinence," but it has all the advantage of a well-established tradition and a sanction derived from a century of acceptance and support.

It is expedient and practical because we can today put behind it not only

the vast power and resources of our own country, but in large measure those of the South American continent as well. Its sanction is greater today than at any time in its history. And finally, it is sound policy because its principles are in harmony with the ideas of justice the world over.

The great declaration [says Mr. Root] was not a chance expression of the opinion of the feeling of the moment. It crystallized the sentiment for human liberty and human rights which saved American idealism from the demoralization of narrow selfishness, and has given to American democracy its world power in the virile potency of a great example.

The Monroe Doctrine has taken its place among the world's great charters of liberty. By securing the possibility of peace on this hemisphere it greatly advanced the cause of peace for the world at large.

The Monroe Doctrine and a World Organization

By HON. HENRY W. TAFT

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IN the year 1823 the Napoleonic Wars had but shortly been concluded, when there was formed what was then exploited as a League of Nations for the preservation of peace. It had the high-sounding title of the Holy Alliance. It has been correctly described, however, as being neither holy nor an alliance. It was composed of most of the nations of Europe and was evidenced by an instrument couched in solemn and high-sounding phrase. Nevertheless, this country believed, and perhaps with some reason, that the chief object of the Alliance was the continuance and enforcement of the autocratic monarchical principle of government.

That idea resulted in 1823 in the

announcement by President Monroe of the national policy, which has ever since gone by the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Shortly before that, and this was the immediate and concrete occasion for its promulgation, the South American countries had through revolution succeeded in securing their political independence of Spain. It was anticipated, and in spite of the pronouncements which have been given by Professor Moore¹ from John Adams, it has always been my understanding, that the immediate cause of the Monroe Doctrine was the fear that these European nations, and particularly the members of the Holy Alliance, standing for the monarchical idea,

¹See page 31.